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Abstract
We consider a bilevel optimization framework corresponding to a monopoly spatial pricing problem: the price
for a set of given facilities maximizes the profit (upper level problem) taking into account that the demand is
determined by consumers’ cost minimization (lower level problem). In our model, both transportation costs
and congestion costs are considered, and the lower level problem is solved via partial transport mass theory.
The partial transport aspect of the problem comes from the fact that each consumer has the possibility to
remain out of the market. We also generalize the model and our variational analysis to the stochastic case
where utility involves a random term.
Keywords: monopoly spatial pricing, partial optimal mass transport, congestion, random utility.
1. Introduction
Since the classical work of Hotelling [1], spatial pricing issues have received a lot of attention. Many gen-
eralizations and variants of Hotelling’s competitive model where firms compete both in locations and prices
have been studied in literature (see e.g. [2] and the references therein). In the present paper, we consider a
monopoly situation but allow for general transport costs, congestion effects and possible randomness in the5
consumers’ utility.
In our model, there is a fixed finite set of locations at which the monopoly can sell an homogeneous
good to a continuum of consumers, distributed according to a given spatial distribution µ. Our aim is
to analyze profit maximizing spatial pricing. The profit maximization can naturally (as in Mallozzi and
Passarelli di Napoli [3]) be viewed as a special instance of bilevel optimization. Indeed, consumer’s demands10
at each facility location is determined by their cost minimizing behavior, based not only on price but also
on travelling cost and congestion or queing (as in Crippa, Jimenez and Pratelli [4]) effects. We call the
consumer’s demand stage, given the price system, the lower level and the profit maximization with respect
to the price the upper level. The lower level problem can be seen as an equilibrium partition problem, in the
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same spirit as the generalized market area problem ([5], [6]) where the production levels and the distribution15
patterns at n plants are determined simultaneously to satisfy the demand distributed over a given region.
Our analysis of the lower level problem with congestion is very similar to the variational/mass transport
approach of [4], with one important difference in the fact that, in our model, we do not impose that the
market is fully covered, i.e. that the total demand is the mass of µ. Indeed, in our model, consumers have a
reservation cost, corresponding to the option of not purchasing the good anywhere and then paying zero cost.20
It may then well be the case that some consumers remain out of the market and this effect is actually even
strenghtened by congestion effects. It is also important to allow the market not to be fully covered since it
might be too costly for the monopoly hence non-optimal for the upper level problem. We show nevertheless
that the analysis of [4] easily extends to the not covered case provided one allows partial optimal transport
(see for instance Figalli [7] for a detailed analysis of partial optimal transport, in particular for a quadratic25
cost). The importance of partial optimal transport in optimal/equilibrium partition problems was clearly
emphasized in the recent work of Wolansky [8] who introduced a new cooperative approach to partition
games (but did not consider congestion effects). This quite general framework enables us to go one step
further and prove an existence result for the upper level. Note that, in our upper level problem, the demands
for some facilities can vanish, so if we imagine that the finite set of feasible facilities for the monopoly is30
a very fine discretization of the whole urban region, the upper level problem also determines the effective
optimal operating locations for the monopoly. Deeper theoretical or numerical investigations of optimal
prices are left for future research.
Most realistic economic situations involve some stochastic effects (see e.g. [9], for a random utility scheme
in a competitive facility problem). Another contribution of our paper is to allow for some randomness (or35
heterogeneity) in consumers’ utilities and to show how the variational approach to the lower level problem
can be extended to this noisy setting.
The organization of the paper is the following: the model is described in section 2 and some tractable
examples are presented in section 3. The lower level problem is shown to be equivalent to a convex variational
problem in section 4, we deduce an existence result for the monopolit’s upper level problem in section 5.40
Our analysis is extended to the random utility case in section 6. Some technical results from optimal partial
transport and convex duality are gathered in the appendix.
2. The model
We consider an urban area given by Ω ⊂ Rd, a bounded domain (i.e. open connected) of Rd, the density
of population/customers in this region is given by a probability measure µ ∈ P(Ω) which captures the45
potential spatial distribution of demand. We are interested in the profit-maximizing pricing policies of a
monopoly operating at N given distinct locations y1, · · · , yN ∈ Ω
N
. Each customer is assumed to purchase
either 1 or 0 quantity of the good sold by the monopoly at one of the locations y1, · · · , yN . The demand
for the good at each location y1, · · · , yN results from the cost-minimizing behavior of customers which we
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now describe. First (and this is in contrast with the model of [4] for instance), we assume that customers50
also have the option of not purchasing the good then getting a reservation cost of 0. If, on the contrary,
a customer from x decides to purchase the good from the monopoly at yj, her cost will be the sum of a
transport cost c(x, yj), a congestion (or queing cost) cost hj(ωj) where ωj is the demand at location j net
of a utility uj for purchasing the good at a price pj. Prices pj and demands ωj ’s are the main unknowns to
be determined from the monopoly and customers’ rational behaviors.55
In addition to the city Ω and the locations y1, · · · , yN , the data of the model are the transport cost c,
the customers distributions µ, the congestion functions hj , the vector of utilities u := (u1, · · · , uN ) (in the
sequel, we shall always use bold letters to denote vectors) and the monopoly’s production cost function C.
We shall always assume the following:
• c ∈ C0(Ω× Ω,R+),60
• each congestion function hj : [0, 1] → R+ is continuous and increasing,
• c and µ satisfy the nondegeneracy conditions: for every α ∈ R and for every i, j ∈ {1, · · · , N}2 with
i 6= j one has
µ({x ∈ Ω : c(x, yj) = α}) = µ({x ∈ Ω : c(x, yi)− c(x, yj) = α}) = 0, (1)
• denoting
∆N := {ω = (ω1, · · · , ωN ) ∈ R
N
+ :
N∑
i=1
ωi ≤ 1}
and by C: ∆N → R+ the monopoly’s cost function, C is lsc on ∆N (a reasonable form for C is
C(ω) := Φ(
∑N
i=1 ωi)+
∑N
i=1 Φi(ωi) where Φ represents the production cost and Φi represents a location-
dependent operating cost which may naturally involve a fixed cost and thus be lsc but not necessarily
continuous at 0).65
Given a price system p := (p1, · · · , pN ) and demands ω := (ω1, · · · , ωN), agents located at x, can
either stay where they are and pay 0 reservation cost or purchase the good at location j for the total cost
c(x, yj)+hj(ωj)+pj−uj. If minj=1,··· ,N{c(x, yj)+hj(ωj)+pj−uj} > 0, agents located at x just stay out of the
market, if one the contrary minj=1,··· ,N{c(x, yj)+hj(ωj)+pj−uj} < 0, agents located at x choose to purchase
the good at a location yi for which minj=1,··· ,N{c(x, yj)+hj(ωj)+pj−uj} = c(x, yi)+hi(ωi)+pi−ui. Thanks
to the nondegeneracy condition (1), the sets of customers which are indifferent between either purchasing
the good or not or between purchasing it optimally at two distinct locations are negligible. This implies that
given the prices p, the demand vector ω = (ω1, · · · , ωN ) has to fulfill for every i the following consistency
relations:
ωi = µ(Di(p,ω) ∩D(p,ω)) (2)
3
where
D(p,ω) := {x ∈ Ω : min
j=1,··· ,N
{c(x, yj) + hj(ωj) + pj − uj} < 0}, (3)
and
Di(p,ω) := ∩j 6=i{x ∈ Ω : c(x, yi) + hi(ωi) + pi − ui < c(x, yj) + hj(ωj) + pj − uj}. (4)
The monopoly’s problem then consists in maximizing its profit:
Π(p,ω) := p · ω − C(ω)
subect to the condition that ω and p are linked by the consistency conditions (2)-(3)-(4). This is a typical
instance of bi-level program, we shall refer to the conditions (2)-(3)-(4) as the lower level (or equilibrium
constraint) and shall call the upper level the profit maximization problem:
sup
p∈RN
+
sup{Π(p,ω) : ω ∈ LL(p)} (5)
where LL(p) denotes the set of ω ∈ ∆N for which (2)-(3)-(4) hold. The fact that the lower-level problem
has a unique solution ω(p) which can be found very conveniently by variational mass transport arguments
was first emphasized by Crippa, Jimenez and Pratelli in [4] in the case where customers do not have the
option of not purchasing the good at all. We shall see in section 4 that these arguments can be adapted to
our framework by using partial optimal transport, let us also remark that our assumptions on the transport70
cost are more general than in [4].
3. Motivating examples
Before going further, we start with some simple examples with one or two facility locations on an interval
and with a uniform distribution of consumers. Our primary aim is to emphasize that the market is in
general not fully covered when prices optimize profit, we illustrate this in a simple linear city model. We75
then consider a toy model with a random demand, the general form of such models will be addressed in
section 6.
• A single facility case
We consider here the linear city case where Ω = (0, 1), a uniform distribution of customers, the
Euclidean distance as transport cost and a single facility located at the center of the city y1 =
1
2 . Here,
in the single facility case, we omit the index 1 in the notation. The congestion cost is taken proportional
to the demand, i.e. h(ω) = αω so that the strength of congestion is captured by the parameter α ≥ 0
and the utility derived from purchasing the good is given by u > 0. A direct computation shows that
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the demand ω(p) is given for p < u (otherwise it is zero) by
ω(p) =



2(u−p)
1+2α if u− p− α ≤
1
2
1 otherwise
Assuming that the production cost is quadratic: C(ω) = λ2ω
2, the profit maximization can be solved
explicitly and leads to two cases:80
– if u < 1 + 2α+ λ then the optimal prices, demand and profits are given by
p∗ =
1 + 2α+ 2λ
2 + 4α+ 2λ
u, ω∗ =
u
1 + 2α+ λ
, Π∗ =
u2
2 + 4α+ 2λ
,
– if u ≥ 1 + 2α+ λ, the maximizing profit situation corresponds to
p∗ = u− α−
1
2
, ω∗ = 1, Π∗ = u− α−
1 + λ
2
.
In other words, the market is not fully covered if u is small compared to production and congestion
costs i.e. whenever u < 1 + 2α+ λ.
• Uncovered market with two facilities
Consider now the case where the two facilities are located at the extreme points of the city y1 = 0 and
y2 = 1. The transportation cost function is again the Euclidean distance and the congestion cost for
each facility hi(ωi) = αωi proportional to the demand for this facility (α ≥ 0 as before). For simplicity
we assume the same utility u1 = u2 = u for both facilities. For a price vector p := (p1, p2) the demand
ω = (ω1, ω2) is given by
ω1 = µ(D1(p,ω) ∩D(p,ω)), ω2 = µ(D2(p,ω) ∩D(p,ω)) (6)
where
D1(p,ω) = {x ∈ (0, 1) : x <
1
2
+
p2 − p1
2(1 + α)
}. (7)
The demands are given by85
ω1 = µ(D1(p,ω) ∩D(p,ω))
= µ({x ∈ (0, 1) : x <
1
2
+
p2 − p1
2(1 + α)
} ∩ {x ∈ (0, 1) : x <
u− p1
1 + α
}) (8)
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ω2 = µ(D2(p,ω) ∩D(p,ω))
= µ({x ∈ (0, 1) : x >
1
2
+
p2 − p1
2(1 + α)
} ∩ {x ∈ (0, 1) : x > 1 +
p2 − u
1 + α
}). (9)
Denote L = 2u − (1 + α). For a vector price such that p1 + p2 > L the market is not totally served
since u−p11+α <
1
2 +
p2−p1
2(1+α) and also
1
2 +
p2−p1
2(1+α) < 1 +
p2−u
1+α . The demands are thus given by
ω1 =



u−p1
1+α if L ≤ p1 + p2
1
2 +
p2−p1
2(1+α) if p1 + p2 < L
ω2 =



u−p2
1+α if L ≤ p1 + p2
1
2 +
p1−p2
2(1+α) if p1 + p2 < L
p1
p2
ω1 + ω2<1
ω1 + ω2=1
L
L
Figure 1: Uncovered market with two facilities.
In case of zero cost for the monopoly C(ω) = 0, the upper level problem reads
sup
p∈RN
+
p · ω = sup
p∈RN
+



p1
(
u−p1
1+α
)
+ p2
(
u−p2
1+α
)
if L ≤ p1 + p2
p1
(
1
2 +
p2−p1
2(1+α)
)
+ p2
(
1
2 +
p1−p2
2(1+α)
)
if p1 + p2 < L.
If the congestion effect is large i.e. u ≤ 1 + α the optimal prices are (u2 ,
u
2 ) and the optimal profit
obtained is u
2
2(1+α) . Note that for u = 1+α the optimal price system is (
u
2 ,
u
2 ) = (
L
2 ,
L
2 ) and the market
is totally served since the utility is sufficiently high to compensate the congestion effect.90
• A case with random utility
Now, let us consider the case where the utility is no longer deterministic but contains a random
component. For the sake of simplicity in our example, we just take zero congestion and production
costs, assume again Ω = (0, 1) with uniformly distributed customers and a single facility located at
6
y = 0. If we take a deterministic utility equal to 12 , the optimal price is unique equal to
1
4 and95
the optimal profit is 116 . Now consider that the utility is random of the form 1 − ε with ε uniformly
distributed on [0, 1], the average utility is 12 as in the previous deterministic case. Consumers located at
x purchase the good whenever x+p−1+ε < 0, which has probability F (1−p−x) where F denotes the
cdf of the uniform distribution on [0, 1], the demand thus takes the form p 7→ ω(p) :=
∫ 1
0 F (1−p−x)dx.
If we take p = 13 , a direct computation gives that ω(
1
3 ) =
2
9 yielding a profit
2
27 larger than the optimal100
profit 116 in the deterministic case. This example shows that the presence of randomness may actually
increase the monopoly profits and should therefore be taken into account both at the lower and upper
levels, this is what we shall do in section 6.
4. Solving the lower level by partial optimal transport
The goal of this section is to show that given p ∈ RN , there exists a unique ω ∈ ∆N which satisfies
the lower-level problem LL(p). The main ingredient in this result is the use of a variational problem which
involves a partial optimal transport problem (we refer the reader to the Appendix for details). First, let us
set some notations, given ω ∈ ∆N let us define h(ω) := (h1(ω1), · · · , hN (ωN )) and for b = (b1, · · · , bN) ∈ R
N
let us introduce the (open in Ω) cells:
A(b) := {x ∈ Ω : min
i=1,··· ,N
{c(x, yi)− bi} < 0} (10)
and for every i = 1, · · · , N :
Ai(b) := ∩j 6=i{x ∈ Ω : c(x, yi)− bi < c(x, yj)− bj}. (11)
So that one can rewrite the lower level requirement ω ∈ LL(p) as
ωi = µ(Ai(u− p− h(ω)) ∩A(u− p− h(ω)), i = 1, · · · , N. (12)
For each i, let us introduce the strictly convex function Hi by
Hi(t) :=
∫ t
0
hi(s)ds, ∀t ≥ 0.
Let us define for every ω ∈ ∆N , the optimal partial transport cost:
M−(ω) :=



MK−(c, µ,
∑N
i=1 ωiδyi) if ω ∈ ∆N
+∞ otherwise
where MK−(c, µ, ν) is, as defined in (22), the value of the partial optimal transport problem for the cost c
between µ and ν (a positive measure with total mass less than 1). We refer to the Appendix for a detailed
7
study of this function but it is easy to see that it is convex with respect to ν so that M− is convex. Let us
then fix p ∈ RN and define for every ω ∈ ∆N
Jp(ω) := M−(ω) + (p− u) · ω +
N∑
i=1
Hi(ωi) (13)
Since Jp is a strictly convex (as the sum of the transport cost, which is convex and a strictly convex105
congestion cost) and lsc function, it admits a unique minimizer ω(p) on the convex compact set ∆N , moreover
it is easy to check that p 7→ ω(p) is continuous by compactness and strict convexity.
Theorem 1. Let p ∈ RN then ω satisfies (12) if and only if ω minimizes Jp over ∆N i.e. ω = ω(p). In
particular LL(p) has one and only one solution ω(p) and it depends continuously on p.
Proof. Note that Jp is the sum of the convex lsc function M− and a convex and differentiable function whose
gradient is h + p− u, hence ω minimizes Jp if and only if 0 ∈ ∂Jp(ω) i.e. u − p− h(ω) ∈ ∂M−(ω) which
is equivalent to the fact that b := u − p − h(ω) solves the dual of MK−(c, µ,
∑N
i=1 ωiδyi) (see (28) in the
Appendix) which is equivalent (see Lemma 5 in the Appendix) to the requirement that
ωi = µ(Ai(u − p− h(ω)) ∩A(u − p− h(ω))), i = 1, · · · , N,
which is exactly (12).110
5. The upper level problem
Thanks to Theorem 1, we may rewrite the upper level problem (5) as
sup
p∈RN
+
π(p) where π(p) := p · ω(p)− C(ω(p)) (14)
and ω(p) denotes the minimizer of Jp given by (13). To prove existence, it is useful to observe that one can
impose a bound on prices:
Lemma 1. Define M := 1 + maxj=1,··· ,N uj then for every p ∈ R
N
+ if we define p̃ = (p̃1, · · · , p̃N) by
p̃i := min(pi,M) then ω(p̃) = ω(p).115
Proof. First observe that since transport costs and congestion costs are nonnegative if pi ≥M then ωi(p) = 0
and therefore p̃ · ω(p) = p · ω(p). Set ω := ω(p), to show that ω = ω(p̃) it is enough to show that b̃ :=
u− p̃−h(ω) solves the dual of MK−(c, µ,
∑N
i=1 ωiδyi) (see (28) in the Appendix). Setting b := u−p−h(ω),
we first have
M−(ω) =
∫
Ω
min(0, min
i=1,··· ,N
(c(x, yi)− bi))dµ(x) + b · ω
8
but, by construction, b̃ · ω = b · ω and
min(0, min
i=1,··· ,N
(c(x, yi)− bi)) = min(0, min
i=1,··· ,N
(c(x, yi)− b̃i))
so that ω = ω(p̃).
We then have
Proposition 1. The upper level program (14) admits at least one solution.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 1 that the supremum of π on RN+ is the same as the supremum of π over the
compact set [0,M ]N . But since π is usc thanks to the lsc of C and the continuity of p 7→ ω(p), π achieves120
its maximum over [0,M ]N hence on RN+ .
Remark 1. The upper level problem can also be formulated in terms of quantities rather than prices. Indeed,
we have seen that
ω = ω(p) ⇐⇒ u− p ∈ ∂M−(ω) + h(ω) ⇐⇒ p ∈ u− (∂M− + h)(ω)
and u − (∂M− + h)(.) has a closed graph. So one can write the upper level as an optimization problem on
ω (which lives on a compact set) as
sup
ω∈∆N
(u− h(ω)) · ω − C(ω)− inf
q∈∂M−(ω)
q · ω.
6. Extension to the random utility case
We now consider the case where the utility may be random, i.e. in addition to the deterministic utility
level ui there is some noisy component εi, where for i = 1, · · · , N , εi is a random variable defined on some
probability space (A,F ,P). We then set ε := (ε1, · · · , εN) and assume that the noise is integrable and
satisfies a nonatomicity assumption:
ε ∈ L1((A,F ,P),RN ), P(εi − εj = t) = 0 = P(εi = t), ∀t ∈ R, ∀i 6= j. (15)
Given a vector of net utilities u ∈ RN to which we add the noise ε we define, similarly to what we did in
section 4, the following sets (which are now random):
A(b+ ε) := {x ∈ Ω : min
i=1,··· ,N
{c(x, yi)− bi − εi} < 0} (16)
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and for every i = 1, · · · , N :
Ai(b+ ε) := ∩j 6=i{x ∈ Ω : c(x, yi)− bi − εi < c(x, yj)− bj − εj}. (17)
Given a price system p, the total utility of an agent purchasing the good at location yi is now random and
given by c(x, yi)+hi(ωi)+ pi−ui− εi where ωi is the total demand for location yi and hi(ωi) represents the
congestion cost. The lower-level problem, consists, given p, in finding ω = (ω1, · · · , ωN ) ∈ ∆N such that for
every i, ωi coincides with the average demand for location i, in the random setting, this reads as:
ωi = E
(
µ(Ai(u+ ε) ∩A(u+ ε))
)
, i = 1, · · · , N, with b := u− p− h(ω). (18)
We can adapt the variational approach of section 4 to this random setting, and in particular define a
noisy analogue of the partial transport cost M− which we define for ω ∈ ∆N by:
NM−(ω) := sup
b∈RN
{b · ω +
∫
Ω
E
(
min(0,min
i
(c(x, yi)− bi − εi))
)
dµ(x)} (19)
we refer to the appendix for a detailed study of the convex and lsc functional NM− and in particular a dual
formula. For fixed p ∈ RN , define for every ω ∈ ∆N
NJp(ω) := NM−(ω) + (p− u) · ω +
N∑
i=1
Hi(ωi) (20)
Since NJp is a strictly convex and lsc function, it admits a unique minimizer ω(p) on the convex compact
set ∆N , again it is easy to see that it implies that p 7→ ω(p) is continuous.125
Theorem 2. Let p ∈ RN then ω solves the noisy lower-level problem (18) if and only if ω minimizes NJp
over ∆N . In particular (18) has one and only one solution ω(p) and it depends continuously on p.
Proof. As in the proof of theorem 1, ω minimizes NJp if and only if 0 ∈ ∂NJp(ω) i.e. u − p − h(ω) ∈
∂NM−(ω) which, by duality (see the Appendix and in particular Lemma 6 and (38)-(39) for details) is
equivalent to the fact that b := u− p− h(ω) solves the concave maximization problem
sup
b∈RN
{b · ω + V (b)} (21)
where
V (b) :=
∫
Ω
E
(
min(0,min
i
(c(x, yi)− bi − εi))
)
dµ(x)
but, thanks to (15) and Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem, it is easy to see that V is differentiable
with
∂V
∂bi
(b) = −E
(
µ(Ai(u+ ε) ∩A(u+ ε))
)
.
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The necessary and sufficient optimality condition for (21) therefore is
ωi = E
(
µ(Ai(u + ε) ∩A(u+ ε))
)
, i = 1, · · · , N,
so that (18) is a necessary and sufficient condition for ω to minimize NJp.
Remark 2. If we assume that the noises are upper bounded εi ≤ λ, almost surely and for every i, for some130
nonnegative constant λ, then, arguing exactly as in lemma 1, and setting M := 1 + λ+maxj=1,··· ,N uj one
can see that changing a price system p ∈ RN+ into p̃ = (p̃1, · · · , p̃N ) with p̃i := min(pi,M) then one still has
ω(p̃) = ω(p) in the noisy setting and p · ω(p) = p̃ · ω(p) so that both p and p̃ give the same profit. The
upper level profit maximization problem can therefore again be brought down to a maximization problem on
a compact set, existence of at least one optimal price directly follows.135
7. Appendix
7.1. On the partial optimal transport problem
Duality
In this appendix, we gather some useful results on the partial optimal mass transport problems which
we have used in the paper. These results are all more or less folklore in the field, we recall them for the140
sake of completeness and for the reader’s convenience, we refer to [7] for further results in particular on the
regularity of optimal partial transport.
Let ν ∈ M+(Ω) (ν a (positive) Borel measure on Ω) such that ν(Ω) ≤ 1, the optimal partial transport
problem between µ (that is a probability) and ν (with mass less than 1) is then defined as
MK−(c, µ, ν) := inf
γ∈Π−(µ,ν)
∫
Ω×Ω
c(x, y)dγ(x, y) (22)
where
Π−(µ, ν) := {γ ∈ P(Ω× Ω) π1#γ ≤ µ, π2#γ = ν} (23)
and π1(x, y) = x, π2(x, y) = y so that Π−(µ, ν) is the set of Borel measures on Ω× Ω with second marginal
ν and first marginal less than µ. Note that Π−(µ, ν) is a convex and weakly ∗-compact set of measures so
that the continuity of c ensures that (22) admits a solution. As a linear programming problem, (22) also
admits the following dual expression:
MK−(c, µ, ν) := sup
{∫
Ω
adµ+
∫
Ω
bdν : a, b ∈ C0(Ω), a ≤ 0, a⊕ b ≤ c
}
(24)
where a ⊕ b denotes (x, y) 7→ a(x) + b(y). We omit the proof of this duality formula which can easily be
deduced from Fenchel-Rockafellar’s theorem [10]. Note that for fixed b, the constraint on a can be rewritten
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as
a ≤ min(0, bc) where bc(x) := min
y
{c(x, y)− b(y)}
so that the dual can be rewritten in terms of b only as
sup
b∈C0(Ω)
{∫
Ω
min(0, bc)dµ+
∫
Ω
bdν
}
(25)
or similarly in terms of a only as
sup
a∈C0(Ω),a≤0
K(a) where K(a) :=
∫
Ω
adµ+
∫
Ω
acdν (26)
where ac(y) := minx{c(x, y)− a(x)}. Now let us explain why (26) (hence (24)) admits a solution:
Lemma 2. The dual problem (26) admits solutions.
Proof. Take a ∈ C0(Ω) with a ≤ 0 and set â = min(0, (ac)
c), it is well known (see for instance [11]) that145
(ac)
c ≥ a and that ((ac)
c)c = ac but since a 7→ a
c is order reversing and â ≤ (ac)
c we have âc ≥ ((ac)
c)c = ac
so that K(â) ≥ K(a). Define then ã = â − max â then K(ã) = K(â) − max â(1 − ν(Ω)) ≥ K(â) ≥ K(a).
We then take a maximizing sequence (an) for (26), by replacing it as previously by ãn, we obtain another
maximizing sequence such that max ãn = 0 for every n and which is uniformly equicontinuous (because the
set {min(0, (ac)
c), a ∈ C0(Ω)} is uniformly equicontinuous). It thus follows from Ascoli-Arzela’s theorem150
that ãn has a subsequence which converges uniformly to some nonpositive continuous function a and it is
then clear that a solves (26).
Semi discrete case
We now consider the case where ν :=
∑N
i=1 ωiδyi where ω ∈ ∆N and assume that the cost c and the
probability µ satisfy the nondegeneracy condition (1) and simply set
M−(ω) := MK−(c, µ,
N∑
i=1
ωiδyi).
In this semi discrete setting, the duality formula (25) can be written in terms of a single vector of prices
b = (b1, · · · , bN) at the locations (y1, · · · yN ) and takes the form:
M−(ω) = sup
b∈RN
{∫
Ω
min(0, min
i=1,··· ,N
(c(x, yi)− bi))dµ(x) +
N∑
i=1
biωi
}
(27)
It is now convenient to introduce the (convex and continuous) function
E(b) := −
∫
Ω
min(0, min
i=1,··· ,N
(c(x, yi)− bi))dµ(x), ∀b ∈ R
N
12
and to observe that155
Lemma 3. The Legendre transform of E, E∗ has the form
E∗(ω) =



M−(ω) if ω ∈ ∆N
+∞ otherwise.
Proof. If ω ∈ ∆N , this is just the duality formula (27), it remains to prove that E
∗(ω) = +∞ if one of the
ωi’s is negative (but it is clear by taking bj = 0 for j 6= i and bi → −∞) or if
∑N
i=1 ωi > 1 (but again this is
clear by taking b = (λ, · · ·λ), letting λ→ ∞).
From this lemma, we immediately deduce that for b and ω in RN , we have the equivalence:
b ∈ ∂E∗(ω) ⇐⇒ ω ∈ ∂E(b) ⇐⇒ ω ∈ ∆N and b solves (27). (28)
It remains to characterize the solutions of MK−(c, µ,
∑N
i=1 ωiδyi) and its dual (27):
Lemma 4. Assume (1). Let b solve (27) then the partial optimal transport problem MK−(c, µ,
∑N
i=1 ωiδyi)
admits a unique solution which is given by
γ :=
(
id,
N∑
i=1
1Ai(b)
yi
)
#
(1A(b)µ), (29)
where Ai(b) and A(b) are given by (11) and (10).160
Proof. Let γ ∈ Π−(µ,
∑N
i=1 ωiδyi) solve MK−(c, µ,
∑N
i=1 ωiδyi) then defining θ := π1#γ, one can write γ is
the form
γ(dx, dy) = θ(dx)⊗
( N∑
i=1
αi(x)δyi(dy)
)
, with αi ≥ 0,
N∑
i=1
αi = 1 θ-a.e. (30)
and since π2#γ =
∑N
i=1 ωiδyi , one has
∫
Ω
αidθ = ωi, for i = 1, · · · , N. (31)
It now follows from (27) that
∫
Ω×Ω
c dγ =
N∑
i=1
∫
Ω
αi(x)c(x, yi)dθ(x) =
∫
Ω
a dµ+
N∑
i=1
biωi (32)
where a(x) := min(0, ϕ) with ϕ(x) := mini{c(x, yi)−bi}. By construction we have c(x, yi) ≥ ϕ(x)+bi hence,
thanks to (31)
N∑
i=1
∫
Ω
αi(x)c(x, yi)dθ(x) ≥
∫
Ω
ϕdθ +
N∑
i=1
biωi (33)
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but since ϕ ≥ a and θ ≤ µ and a ≤ 0, we have
∫
Ω×Ω
c dγ ≥
∫
Ω
adθ + b · ω ≥
∫
Ω
adµ+ b · ω. (34)
With (32), we deduce that all inequalities in (33) and (34) should be equalities. Thanks to (1), equality in
(33) firstly implies that αi = 1Ai(p) µ-a.e. hence also θ-a.e.. Secondly, having two equalities in (34) means
that a = ϕ, i.e. ϕ ≤ 0 on Supp(θ) and a = 0, i.e. ϕ ≥ 0 on Supp(µ− θ), since µ({ϕ = 0}) = 0 thanks to (1).
This implies that θ = 1{ϕ<0}µ = 1A(p)µ which proves (29).
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Lemma 5. Assume (1). Let b ∈ RN then b solves (27) if and only if
ωi = µ(Ai(b) ∩A(b)) for i = 1, · · · , N (35)
where Ai(b) and A(b) are given by (11) and (10).
Proof. Necessity follows from Lemma 4, indeed if b solves (27), the second marginal of γ given by (29)
being
∑N
i=1 ωiδyi directly gives (35). Conversely, assume that b satisfies (35) and define γ by (29), then
γ ∈ Π−(µ,
∑N
i=1 ωiδyi) and a direct computation gives
∫
Ω×Ω
c dγ =
N∑
i=1
∫
Ai(b)∩A(b)
c(x, yi)dµ(x)
=
∫
Ω
min(0, min
j=1,··· ,N
(c(x, yj)− bj)) dµ+
N∑
i=1
biωi
which, by duality, implies that γ solves MK−(c, µ,
∑N
i=1 ωiδyi) and b solves (27).
7.2. Optimal partial transport with noise
In what follows the random vector ε = (ε1, · · · , εN ) ∈ L
1((A,F ,P),RN ) satisfies (15). Given ω ∈ ∆N ,
our starting point for studying the noisy lower-level problem (18) is the following maximization problem
whose value defines the function NM−:
NM−(ω) := sup
b∈RN
{b · ω + V (b)} (36)
where
V (b) :=
∫
Ω
E
(
min(0,min
i
(c(x, yi)− bi − εi))
)
dµ(x) (37)
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Obviously, NM− is convex lsc on ∆N . Moreover, since µ is a probability measure,
V (b) ≤ max{c(x, yi) : x ∈ Ω, i = 1, · · · , N}+ E|ε| −max
i
bi,
and then, for every ω ∈ ∆N
NM−(ω) ≤ max{c(x, yi) : x ∈ Ω, i = 1, · · · , N}+ E|ε|
which implies that NM− is also bounded on ∆N . Clearly V is concave and 1-Lipschitz, the Legendre170
transform of NE := −V is characterized by:
Lemma 6. The Legendre transform of NE, NE∗ is
NE∗(ω) =



NM−(ω) if ω ∈ ∆N
+∞ otherwise.
Proof. If ω ∈ ∆N , this is just the definition of NM−(ω) given in (36) and it can be proved that NE
∗(ω) = +∞
if one of the ωi’s is negative similarly to Lemma 3.
From this lemma, we immediately deduce that for b and ω in RN , we have the equivalence:
b ∈ ∂NM−(ω) ⇐⇒ ω ∈ ∂NE(b) (38)
but assumption (15) and Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem ensure that V is differentiable so that
the previous conditions are also equivalent to:
ω +∇V (b) = 0 ⇐⇒ ω ∈ ∆N and b solves (36). (39)
Eventhough it is not essential for the proof of Theorem 2, we would like to emphasize here the fact that
NM−(ω) can be expressed by a dual expression for (36) which is connected to a partial mass transport
problem in the sense that it can be expressed as an infimum over the set of subplans Π−(µ,
∑N
i=1 ωiδyi). Let
Y := {y1, · · · , yN} and endow C
0(Ω×Y ) ≃ C0(Ω)N with the uniform norm, for ψ ∈ C0(Ω×Y ), define then
G(ψ) :=
∫
Ω
E( max
i=1,··· ,N
(ψ(x, yi) + εi)+)dµ(x)
and observe that G is a convex and 1-Lipschitz function on C0(Ω× Y ). For b ∈ RN define Λb ∈ C0(Ω× Y )
by (Λb)(x, yi) := bi, we then have
NE(b) = −V (b) = G(Λb− c), ∀b ∈ RN
15
so that
NM−(ω) = sup
b∈RN
{b · ω −G(Λb − c)}
which by an application of Fenchel-Rockafellar duality theorem [10] can be rewritten as
NM−(ω) = inf
γ∈M(Ω×Y ) : Λ∗γ=
∑
N
i=1 ωiδyi
{∫
Ω×Y
cdγ +G∗(γ)
}
we then observe that Λ∗γ = π2#γ and that if G
∗(γ) < +∞ then necessarily γ ∈ M+(Ω×Y ) and π1#γ ≤ µ.
In other words, the set of joint measures γ in the domain of G∗ and such that π2#γ =
∑N
i=1 ωiδyi is included
in the set of subplans Π−(µ,
∑N
i=1 ωiδyi) hence
NM−(ω) = inf
γ∈Π−(µ,
∑
N
i=1
ωiδyi )
{∫
Ω×Y
cdγ +G∗(γ)
}
.
Note that this is a strictly convex perturbation (G∗ is strictly convex since G is differentiable) of the partial
mass transport problem MK−(c, µ,
∑N
i=1 ωiδyi) where the additional penalization term G
∗ comes from the175
noise on the utility.
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